COB9KY@aol.com
Tue, 7 Dec 1999 15:57:06 EST
In a message dated 07/12/99 11:39:20 GMT Standard Time, dandot@flash.net
writes:
<< For four long years. It was finished by cavalry and mounted infantrymen
fighting afoot with repeating weapons. It was the Union cavalry (moving
faster than Lee's infantry) that enabled Grant to cut off the ANV's
retreat at Appomattox and so bring about the capitulation in that
theatre. >>
I know you're all probably fed up with this by now, but I couldn't let the
guys leave you all under the wrong impression.
>From "A Stillness at Appomattox" by Bruce Catton
The night before the surrender of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia:
' Sheridan came up soon after, with the rest of the Cavalry. He sent hurry-up
messages for the infantry, put half of his men in line, dismounted, facing
the rebel breastworks, and ordered the rest into bivouac near the railroad a
mile to the south.
The road his cavalry was on was the main road to Lynchburg, which lay twenty
miles to the west.
Of all the world's roads, this was the only one that mattered now to the Army
of Northern Virginia. If, when morning came, that army could knock the
Yankees out of the way and march west on this road it might still hope to
live for a while - a day or two, a fortnight, a few months. If it could not
do that, it would cease to exist within twenty-four hours. Cavalry alone
could not bar the way for very long, but if the blue infantry came up in
time, then it would be taps and dipped flags and good-by forever for Lee's
army."
More:
"The Federals [Infantry] got across the Lynchburg Road, swung into line of
battle facing east, and marched toward the firing and the shouting. As they
marched, dismounted cavalry came drifting back, and the troopers waved their
caps and cheered when they saw the infantry, and called out: "Give it to 'em
- we've got 'em in a tight place!"
Further on, and why Lee called for terms:
"The Confederates had scattered the cavalry, and most of the troopers fled
south, across the shallow valley that ran parallel with the Lynchburg Road.
As the last of them left the field the way seemed to be open, and the
Confederates who had driven them away raised a final shout of triumph - and
then over the hill came the first lines of blue infantry, rifles tilted
forward, and here was the end of everything: the Yankees had won the race and
the way was closed forever and there was no going any further."
An overview of the Cavalry's role in the Appomattox Campaign comes from Paddy
Griffiths' 'Rally Once Again'
"The Appomattox campaign does not show us that a battle group of cavalry,
even when armed with repeating carbines, could overcome all obstacles.
Admittedly, there had been some impressive assaults, both on foot and
mounted, in which the rapid fire of the new weapons shocked the opposition
and covered the troopers as they advanced. Some commentators have seen this
tactic as the forerunner of the twentieth - century concept of 'marching
fire'. Yet the rapid-fire weapons also ran out of ammunition more rapidly
than the slower rifle muskets, and Sheridan's men were repeatedly being told
not to waste their rounds. Conversely, the new carbines suffered from various
teething technical problems, especially in the rimfire ammunition itself. The
volume of fire which could be developed in action often fell far short of
expectations ...
... In the Appomattox campaign there were some failures which show us that
mounted infantry was not the complete 'panacea weapon' that its champions
would like us believe. At Dinwiddie Court House Sheridan was badly mauled by
Pickett's shrewd blow, and at Five Forks the cavalry found it could make no
headway against fieldworks. At Jetersville, Sayler's Creek and Appomattox
itself the cavalry's resistance would probably have been overcome if infantry
reinforcements had not arrived in time. The possession of technically
advanced small arms did not ensure victory against all odds."
As to the role of Union Cavalry earlier in the war, especially on the
specific point I raised that <<Cavalry could not successfully attack formed
Infantry with rifled longarms full stop>> Griffiths has to say:
In all we can estimate that perhaps 1400 Union cavalrymen in the East had the
experience of charging Rebel infantry in a major battle during the first
three years of the war, suffering 365 casualties or approximately a quarter
of their strength. Although certain positive results could possibly be
claimed for each charge, the overall outcome can only be described as very
negative indeed. This finding would seem to suggest that the day of the
cavalry charge had passed; that the rifle musket's improved firepower had
given a new security to infantry, even if they had not formed squares; and
that the American cavalry had really been rather wise not to charge more
frequently in these battles than it did, in view of the probable outcome."
Chris O'Brien
The Scalawag Mess
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